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Abstract. The distinction between concrete and abstract concepts is psychologically valid 
but so far it can hardly be quantified in any objective way, which prevents it from being 
further studied in computational linguistics.  This paper proposes a systematic way to 
measure concreteness from the surface structure of dictionary definitions.  Comparing the 
scores from WordNet definitions with human ratings, the method apparently works better 
for concrete senses than abstract ones, and is not adequate for measuring concreteness on a 
finer scale beyond the simple dichotomous distinction.  Future work thus includes exploring 
the possibility of deploying a wider range of surface clues from definitions for the purpose 
and investigating how the method works with definitions from different dictionaries. 
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1 Introduction 
Most people might find it more than normal that concrete concepts are easier to understand and 
learn than abstract concepts.  Such common sense is supported by ample psychological 
evidence from lexical decision tasks and children’s spoken and reading vocabulary (e.g. 
Bleasdale, 1987; Kroll and Merves, 1986; Yore and Ollila, 1985).  However, few studies have 
addressed how this apparently trivial observation might imply on the mental storage and 
organisation of words and their meanings, and whether modelling such distinction between 
concrete and abstract concepts in computational semantic lexicons might benefit natural 
language processing tasks like automatic word sense disambiguation.  For example, how can 
concreteness be included in common ontological organisation of semantic lexicons?  If concrete 
concepts are easier for people than abstract ones, should we expect concrete senses to be more 
easily disambiguated than abstract senses?  If this is the case, should we take it into account 
when evaluating disambiguation performance, perhaps in addition to the similarity among 
senses (e.g. Resnik and Yarowsky, 1999; Palmer et al., 2006)?  Should different information be 
employed for disambiguating concrete and abstract senses? 
One major obstacle to this kind of study is the subjectivity in deciding what is concrete and 
what is abstract, which is a matter of degree and confounded by many factors.  In psychology 
studies, concreteness (or abstractness) has often been measured by averaging human ratings on 
a sample of words.  Human raters give a score for each word on a scale (e.g. from 1 for highly 
abstract to 7 for highly concrete), often based on various factors like the familiarity and 
imageability of the concepts, and frequency of occurrence, but more heavily on their own 
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 experience and probably private cognition.  This way of measuring concreteness is limited in 
scalability.  In addition, ratings on word samples do not say anything on the effect of polysemy.  
A concrete word may also have some abstract senses, and vice versa, and the raters may not be 
thinking of the same sense when rating a word. 
Only if we can have a way to objectively measure concreteness will it be possible for us to 
pursue further studies on the role of such intrinsic nature of word senses in lexical resources 
and natural language processing.  In the current study, we investigate the feasibility of 
obtaining such a measure from dictionary definitions.  The surface linguistic structure of a 
given definition is analysed and mapped to a concreteness score, and the results are compared 
to human ratings. 
In Section 2, we will explain the rationale underlying our approach.  The experiment and 
results will be discussed in Section 3, followed by a conclusion with future directions in 
Section 4. 
2 Our Approach 
The way we propose to measure concreteness is based on a simple intuition.  Dictionaries 
constitute an important source of our lexical knowledge.  Language learners often form their 
perception and understanding of words from dictionary definitions.  Professional 
lexicographers are trained to write definitions informatively and consistently, and it is generally 
assumed in lexicography that concepts corresponding to tangible objects or intangible things 
are more appropriately defined by different styles.  Dictionary definitions thus reflect how 
lexicographers (who are also human beings) perceive the concepts being defined. 
2.1 Definition Styles 
The way in which definitions are structured and phrased has undergone considerable evolution 
in modern lexicography, from “lexicographese” to full-sentence definitions (Atkins and Rundell, 
2008).  Traditional models tend to explain words through relatively short and concise 
definitions, in different defining styles, as summarised in Jackson (2002).  Examples for various 
defining styles are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Examples for Different Defining Styles 
Defining Style Example 
Genus + Differentiae [bag] a flexible container (genus) with a single opening (differentiae) 
Synonymous Phrase [carbon] carbon paper 
Prototype [car] a motor vehicle with four wheels; usually propelled by an internal 
combustion engine (prototype) 
Usage [baby] sometimes used as a term of address for attractive young women 
Full-Sentence Definition [audience] The audience at a play, concert, film, or public meeting is the 
group of people watching or listening to it. 
 
A common way to define a concept is by means of genus (superordinate concept) and 
differentiae (distinctive features), such as “bag” is defined as a kind of “container” 
distinguished from other containers by being flexible and having a single opening.  For words 
which are not easy to be defined by a genus term, the definition is often composed with a 
synonym, a collection of synonyms, or a synonymous phrase.  Sometimes it may not be easy to 
isolate the sufficient and necessary conditions for a sense, and lexicographers will capture the 
essential constituents in the form of prototype.  This is usually combined with genus and 
differentiae but additionally specifies what is typical of a referent with words like “typically” or 
“usually”.  For the rest, where a referent is unlikely to be available, meanings will be explained 
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through their usage in real text.  While tangible objects and physical actions are more easily 
defined with genus, differentiae and prototype, abstract concepts as well as other aspects of 
meanings like connotation and collocations often need to be defined by other means.  Full-
sentence definitions, on the other hand, use more natural prose and often embed the word being 
defined in its typical syntactico-collocational context in the definition (Hanks, 1987).  Although 
this style has been thoroughly used by the COBUILD series of dictionaries, it has not really 
dominated the dictionary market as anticipated but continues to co-exist with most conventional 
defining styles in many other dictionaries.  In the current study, we focus on the surface 
structure of the various traditional defining styles for clues on concreteness. 
2.2 Scoring Definitions by Surface Structure 
Computational linguists have made use of dictionary definitions to semi-automatically acquire 
simple ontologies for nouns (e.g. Chodorow et al., 1985; Vossen et al., 1989).  For instance, 
apart from real genus, Vossen et al. (1989) have also observed other pseudo genus like empty 
kernels (e.g. a kind of …) and those shifting the definition to some non-NPs (e.g. a manner of 
speaking …), which they called linkers and shunters respectively in the LINKS Project. 
In this study, we also exploit the regularity exhibited in definitions to reveal how 
concreteness is perceived in the eyes of lexicographers.  Based on extensive observation and 
analysis of dictionary definitions, we started with the definition patterns roughly outlined in 
Kwong (2008) and fine-tuned them with respect to the outputs given by a dependency parser, 
and implemented a scoring system which analyses the surface structure of a definition.  The 
basic assumption is that the more concrete a concept, the more conveniently and convincingly it 
can be explained with reference to its superordinate concept and distinguishing features.  
Scores are thus assigned according to the presence or absence of various surface structures.  
Figure 1 roughly maps various patterns to a 7-point scale of concreteness. 
 
Figure 1:  Mapping Definition Patterns to 7-Point Scale 
 
To analyse the structure of the definitions, we make use of the dependency parser from Lund 
University (Johansson and Nugues, 2008) and detect the various definition patterns by means of 
the presence or absence of certain dependency relations obtained from the parse results.  Only 
those parses consisting of a root (ROOT) and a predicative complement (PRD) in the form of a 
noun will be of interest to us.  Any of the following dependency relations on the PRD would be 
considered differentiae: Apposition (APPO), Location (LOC), Modifier of nominal (NMOD), 
Object complement (OPRD), and Temporal (TMP).  If any of such relations has a dependency 
from words like “usually”, “often”, “typically”, etc., it would be considered a prototype. 
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 The automatic scoring is thus done this way: Given the dependency parse of a definition 
(such as “car is a motor vehicle …”), we first look for the ROOT (usually “is”) and its 
dependent PRD.  If a PRD as a noun is found, it is treated as the genus and an NP definition is 
assumed to be identified and further processed.  Subsequent analysis of an NP definition 
includes detecting genitives like “X of Y”, checking for differentiae in the form of dependent 
APPO, LOC, NMOD, OPRD, or TMP to the PRD, and prototypes if such dependencies are 
marked by words like “usually” or “typically”.  If no differentiae, prototype, or pre-modifier is 
present, the definition will be considered a synonymous phrase.  The genus is also checked if it 
is possibly an abstract or mass noun, which is currently approximated by the absence of any 
indefinite articles and plural markers.  The scoring flow is summarised in Figure 2 in the form 
of pseudocodes with examples. 
 
Let Genus X = noun at PRD  
Let Score = 4  
if (X…of…Y) is found, then   
 if X  {kind, type, etc.} and Y is mass, then Score=Score-1 // e.g. a kind of commercial enterprise ... 
 else if X  {group, part, etc.} and Y is mass, then Score=Score-1 // e.g. a series of related events … 
 else if Y is –ing verb, then Score=Score -2 // e.g. the manner of speaking to … 
 else {if X is mass, Score=Score-1; if Y is mass, Score=Score-1} // e.g. the content of cognition … 
 stop  
if X  {person, someone, anyone, etc.}, then Score=Score+1, stop // e.g. someone who controls resources … 
if X  {something, somewhere, etc.}, then stop // e.g. something intended as a guide … 
if  Dependency D  {NMOD, APPO, LOC, TMP, OPRD} X at any 
word after X and D is preceded by {usually, typically, often,etc.}, 
 then Score=Score+1 
// prototype 
   e.g. … usually used for drinking 
if  Dependency D  {NMOD, APPO, LOC, TMP, OPRD}  X at any 
word after X, then Score=Score+1 
// differentiae 
   e.g.  [a motor vehicle] with four wheels 
if no prototype and no differentiae is found and  X is mass, 
 then Score = Score -1 
// synonymous phrase with mass noun, 
   e.g. brilliant radiant beauty 
else if  Dependency D  {NMOD}  X at any word before X, 
 then Score=Score+1 
if no prototype and no differentiae and no pre-modifier, 
 then Score=Score-1 
// pre-modifiers, 
   e.g. a very young mammal 
// minimal NP treated as synonym 
   e.g. an idea 
Figure 2:  The Scoring Flow 
3 Experiment 
In the current study, we first used the Lund University dependency parser
1
 to parse dictionary 
definitions, then analysed the parse output according to the above scoring method and 
compared the results with human ratings. 
3.1 Data sources 
Kroll and Merves (1986) used 100 abstract and 100 concrete nouns in their lexical study. The 
words were rated by human subjects for concreteness on a 7-point scale.  The abstract and 
concrete words were matched on the basis of word frequency and word length.  The word 
frequency data were taken from Kucera and Francis (1967).  For the current study, a total of 
100 word samples (50 concrete and 50 abstract) with frequency greater than 20 were selected 
from Kroll and Merves’ list.  The more frequent items were selected so that they would more 
likely be familiar to our human raters.  Sense definitions were collected from WordNet 3.0
2
.  
WordNet started off as a psycholinguistic project for studying human lexical memory but it 
turns out to be a large lexical database of English widely used in computational linguistics.  It 
                                                     
1 Downloaded from http://nlp.cs.lth.se/lt_home/ 
2 http://wordnet.princeton.edu 
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contains individual databases for nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs.  Word senses are 
grouped as sets of synonyms (i.e., synsets).  The synsets are hierarchically organised and linked 
by relational pointers indicating various kinds of lexical relations such as hyponymy, 
meronymy, etc. in the noun hierarchy (Fellbaum, 1998).  Each synset is associated with a 
simple gloss like conventional dictionary definitions.  For our word samples, the concrete 
words have 1 to 17 senses and the abstract words have 1 to 9 senses, with 4.36 and 3.44 senses 
on average respectively. 
3.2 Procedures 
In addition to the average human ratings available from Kroll and Merves (1986), four human 
judges were asked to rate the selected samples on a 7-point scale (with 7 for highly concrete 
and 1 for highly abstract).  They were asked to first rate each given word as a whole, and then 
give a score for individual senses of the words. 
The WordNet definitions were first made complete sentences by adding the headword as 
subject such as “car is a motor vehicle …”, and then parsed.  The parsing results were analysed 
by a program implementing the scoring method above, giving a score for each definition and a 
detailed log for the analysis. 
The scores for individual senses were compared to the human ratings we obtained for this 
study.  For the overall concreteness of a word, we tried two ways for estimating it from the 
individual senses.  One is to take the average of the scores from all senses (AvgDef), assuming 
all component senses of a word contribute equally to its overall concreteness; and the other is to 
take the score for the first sense (FirstDef), assuming the most frequent or familiar sense 
dominates one’s perception of the word in general.  These two measures were compared with 
the original ratings in Kroll and Merves’ study and the ratings of the human raters in this study. 
3.3 Results and Discussion  
We had assumed the validity of the concrete/abstract distinction from psycholinguistic evidence 
to start with, and aimed to investigate whether such a distinction would be similarly reflected in 
dictionary definitions through various defining styles.  It is thus important to see if the two 
groups of words will result in significantly different scores as estimated by different ways (e.g. 
AvgDef and FirstDef) for the word-level concreteness. 
Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of the concreteness ratings for the 100 word 
samples (and for the 50 abstract and 50 concrete samples separately) obtained from human 
raters and WordNet definitions.  The column K&M refers to the original rating from Kroll and 
Merves (1986).  AvgR refers to the average of the four human raters in the current study.  
AvgDef and FirstDef refer to the scores obtained by the two ways respectively from WordNet 
definitions. 
 
Table 2:  Summary of Concreteness Ratings at Word Level 
 K&M AvgR AvgDef FirstDef 
All Word Samples (N=100)     
Mean 4.27 4.58 4.34 4.36 
SD 1.76 1.79 0.92 1.37 
Abstract samples (N=50)     
Mean 2.63 2.96 4.11 3.88 
SD 0.58 0.73 1.03 1.47 
Concrete samples (N=50)     
Mean 5.92 6.19 4.58 4.84 
SD 0.63 0.77 0.74 1.08 
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 The distinction between the two groups of words is particularly clear from the human ratings.  
With K&M, which is our data source, the abstract samples have a mean rating of 2.63 with 
standard deviation of 0.58, and the concrete samples have a mean rating of 5.92 with standard 
deviation of 0.63.  A similarly apparent distinction is also seen in AvgR, with mean at 2.96 and 
standard deviation at 0.73 for the abstract words, and mean at 6.19 and standard deviation at 
0.77 for concrete words.  Interestingly, the human raters in this study seem to be more lenient in 
their scores than those in K&M, as shown by the higher mean ratings for AvgR in Table 2 and 
the distribution of ratings shown in the bar charts in Figure 3.  The variation might be related to 
the small number of human raters in this study and the difference between native and non-
native speakers.  Nevertheless, the distinction between concrete and abstract words is apparent 
among human raters. 
The difference between the mean scores for abstract words and concrete words is much 
smaller with the estimation from definition scores.  The mean is above 3 for abstract words, and 
below 5 for concrete words, with both AvgDef and FirstDef.  The Mann-Whitney rank test 
shows that the difference between the means for abstract words and concrete words is 
statistically significant for both cases.  The dispersion of scores for AvgDef and FirstDef is 
shown in the line charts in Figure 3.  There is obviously a mode at 5 for concrete words, and the 
majority did fall on the high side above 4.  The scores estimated from WordNet definitions by 
FirstDef are roughly bi-modal for the abstract words, while those by AvgDef are somehow 
averaged out giving a mode at 4.  This suggests that words deemed abstract also possess 
considerable concrete senses, and the first senses of about half of the abstract words are not 
necessarily abstract or are not defined as if they are abstract in WordNet. 
 
 
(a) 
  
(b) 
Figure 3:  Score Distribution for (a) Concrete Words and (b) Abstract Words 
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Table 3 shows the Spearman rank correlation (ρ) and the Kendall’s coefficient of 
concordance (W) between the two sets of human ratings and those between the human ratings 
and definition scores on all word samples.  The former measures the interdependence between 
two sets of scores and the latter is used for assessing the agreement among raters, or the 
different rating sources in this study.  Values which are statistically significant at least at the 
0.05 level are indicated in bold.  The human ratings in K&M and those in the current study 
(AvgR) are quite strongly correlated (ρ=0.848), and the overall ranking is very much similar 
(W=0.924).  The strong agreement among human raters provides evidence that a gradient of 
concreteness is shared in human cognition. 
Comparing with the definition scores, it turns out that the first sense of a word in WordNet 
is a relatively better indicator of the overall word concreteness than the average of all senses.  
FirstDef shows better correlation with human ratings (0.301 with K&M and 0.415 with AvgR, 
both are statistically significant).  It suggests that sense frequency might play a very important 
if not predominant role in one’s perception of the concreteness of a word in general, given that 
the most frequent sense is listed as the first sense in WordNet.  However, as seen in Figure 3, 
FirstDef still has a wider and more even spread of scores across the scale, especially for 
abstract words.  Hence words deemed concrete may more likely have a concrete first sense, 
while words deemed abstract may also have frequently used concrete senses.  Alternatively, 
many abstract words (and their first senses) might be unexpectedly describable in the 
lexicographers’ minds. 
 
Table 3:  Degree of Association between Word Concreteness Ratings from Various Sources 
 AvgR AvgDef FirstDef 
Spearman Rank Correlation (ρ)    
    K&M 0.848 0.193 0.301 
    AvgR -- 0.363 0.415 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance (W)    
    K&M 0.924 0.597 0.650 
    AvgR -- 0.681 0.707 
  
 
For the sense level ratings, there are 390 senses altogether, 172 are from the abstract word 
samples, and 218 are from the concrete word samples.  Table 4 shows the mean and standard 
deviation of the concreteness ratings for all senses and separately for senses deemed concrete 
and abstract respectively by human raters.  AvgR is the average rating of the four human raters 
in this study, and is used as a reference here since no comparable ratings at the sense level are 
available from previous studies.  WN refers to the scores from WordNet definitions. 
  
Table 4:  Summary of Concreteness Ratings at Sense Level 
 AvgR WN 
All Sense Samples (N=390)   
    Mean 4.81 4.33 
    SD 1.31 1.27 
Concrete Senses (AvgR≥4, N=270)   
    Mean 5.51 4.47 
    SD 0.89 1.18 
Abstract Senses (AvgR<4, N=120)   
    Mean 3.24 4.03 
    SD 0.44 1.49 
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 Similar to word-level concreteness, the mean of human ratings on the concreteness of 
individual senses is higher than those obtained from definitions.  Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of scores estimated from the definitions, compared with the average human ratings.  
Apparently our categorisation of the defining styles and surface structures of the definitions has 
not been able to realistically distinguish concrete concepts on a finer scale (e.g. highly concrete 
vs mildly concrete) as naturally as human raters.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Score Distribution for Senses 
 
Unlike the word level, human ratings for individual senses show less agreement.  The 
variation is particularly apparent for the abstract concepts.  For instance, one sense of “devil” is 
“an evil supernatural being”, for which the four raters gave 5, 3, 6, and 2 respectively.  The 
concept is obviously intangible, but individual raters might easily imagine the relevant images 
as found in fictions and movies.  The definition, however, is one of genus and differentiae. 
The association between human ratings and definition scores is also weaker at the sense 
level (ρ=0.257, W=0.628), though still statistically significant.  Figure 4 shows a very different 
distribution of scores obtained from definition structures and human raters.  Our categorisation 
of the definition styles yielded most score 5, which covers only a special kind of genus-and-
differentiae definitions.  Scores on the two ends of the scale are relatively rare. 
Thus our results show that measuring concreteness from dictionary definitions based on the 
different defining styles apparently works better for concrete senses than abstract ones.  
Although the two groups of senses can still be told apart in general, the differentiation is not as 
distinct as is found in human ratings, and definition scores lack the ability to further delineate 
concepts of different degrees of concreteness on a finer spectrum.  There are several factors 
which might account for this outcome.  The range of surface structures we have attended to is 
quite narrow.  On the one hand, the concise conventional defining styles may pose a limit on 
including further information with differentiae and prototypes.  On the other hand, very 
common concrete concepts may not need so much detailed explanation as others in a dictionary.  
The assumption that different defining styles are more suitable for concrete concepts and 
abstract concepts is generally valid.  For instance, we do find more definitions involving 
shunters among the abstract senses.  Nevertheless, how a concept is defined may also depend 
on how describable the concept is, which might just be one dimension amongst others 
contributing to the concreteness of the concept perceived by humans.  As we have observed 
from the data, apart from parsing errors (e.g. one definition for “dollar” is “a United States coin 
worth one dollar”, but “coin” was tagged as VBP resulting in subsequent parsing error), 
abstract concepts may also be defined via genus and differentiae, and this might be even more 
serious with WordNet given its hierarchical organisation of the senses.  For instance, the word 
“concept” is defined as “an abstract or general idea inferred or derived from specific instances” 
which scored 6 despite the word “abstract” explicitly appears in the definition.  However, the 
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Collins COBUILD Advanced Dictionary
3
 defines it as “an idea or abstract principle” which 
will only score 3 in our system as it is in the form of a synonym.  Hence in addition to the 
dependency structures, there are other surface clues such as lexical choice and length of 
definition which may suggest on the concreteness of the concept being defined. 
Our results do not only echo the subjectivity in human perception of concreteness (and in 
lexicographers’ perception too), but also suggest the multi-dimensionality of concreteness and 
the importance of finding a systematic measure of this psychologically valid construct so that it 
can be operationalised and objectively studied in computational linguistics. 
4 Conclusion 
Hence we have introduced a systematic way of measuring concreteness from how 
lexicographers understand and explain concepts, by analysing the surface structure of 
definitions.  This is a useful first step to enable further study of a subjective but psychologically 
valid factor in computational linguistics, especially the construction of semantic lexicons and 
evaluation for tasks like word sense disambiguation.  Current results show that the method 
works better for concrete senses, and is in many cases able to make a dichotomous distinction 
between concrete and abstract concepts.  However, it is possible that the different defining 
styles may reveal how describable a concept is, amongst the many factors influencing one’s 
perception of concreteness, and it happens that some abstract senses might be more describable 
than others.  Consequently our method is not adequate for distinguishing concreteness on a 
finer scale.  Our next step is therefore to refine the analysis of definitions in order to deploy a 
wider range of surface clues, and to investigate how the method works with definitions from 
other dictionaries. 
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